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1) Introduction 
 
Both the major growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the last decade and some 
spectacular development success stories such as Ireland have drawn attention to the impact of 
FDI on the local economy. According to Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004), host countries 
can benefit from FDI via several channels: competition effects, the impact on national factor 
demand, and technology spillover effects. This study restricts its view on the last channel. 
 
The empirical research in this channel is not straight forward, because technology spillover 
effects are not directly observable. We employ an approach, where we use a theoretical model 
to derive observable conditions and test them. Then, we conclude by theoretical induction on 
the significance of spillover effects and whether they benefit the host country. 
 
There is a sub-branch of the empirical and theoretical FDI literature that can be interpreted as 
such an approach. Aitken et al. (1996) showed for Venezuela and Mexico that multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) have higher average wage cost than comparable indigenous firms.
2 
Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002)
3 derive from theoretical models the 
conclusion that MNEs pay higher wages, because they want to prevent leakage of superior 
technology to local competitors through worker turnover. The wage premium then indicates 
the economic value of the host country benefit from potential technology spillover effects. 
 
We depart from the theoretical models of Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002) by 
assuming that learning from MNEs takes time. When incorporating this assumption, we find 
that MNEs are able to internalize the learning effect by paying higher wages than indigenous 
                                                 
2 These results have been extended to the US by Doms and Jensen (1998) and Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) and 
replicated on a number of other countries such as Canada by Globerman, Ries, and Vertinsky (1994), the UK by 
Dickerson et al. (1997), Conyon et al. (2002), Girma et al. (2001), Indonesia by Lipsey and Sjöholm (2001, 
2003), five African countries by Te Velde and Morrisey (2001), Ghana by Görg et al. (2002), and for Hungary 
by Kertesi and Köllő (1999, 2001) to mention a few. 
3 A similar model set-up has been used earlier in Markusen (2001) to discuss intellectual property right 
protection in developing countries.   3
firms after learning and lower wages before. Hence, the expected life-time income of host-
country workers remains unaffected by foreign takeovers. A host-country benefit can still 
arise from a technology spillover effect additional to learning such that an MNE-trained 
worker contributes more to local firms’ productivity than to MNEs’. Then, MNEs will 
specialize in training workers, discount wages by the value of their human capital production, 
and workers will move to indigenous firms after training. Since there is a productivity gain to 
indigenous firms that does not accrue to MNEs, indigenous firms are able to hire the MNE-
trained worker at wages below marginal productivity. Hence, the host countries’ welfare gain 
from technology spillovers consists of an increase of indigenous firms’ profits. 
 
We use a large employee-employer matched dataset of a representative sample of workers in 
Hungarian manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees over the period from 1992 until 
2001 and test three conditions on the change in the wage-, the productivity-, and the worker-
turnover-rates during the course of foreign takeovers. We find that wages of high-skilled 
workers fall directly after a foreign takeover and rise again in the following years. Matching 
and control function techniques control for takeover-selection bias on observables and 
unobservables. Moreover, productivity grows gradually after a takeover suggesting a slow 
learning process. Finally, worker turnover falls after takeover. All three observations square 
only with the regime in our theoretical model, when the host country does not benefit from 
technology spillover effects, but reject Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002). 
 
Hungary can be considered a particularly interesting country to investigate the research 
question of spillover effects through MNEs for three reasons: 1) Hungary was largely cut-off 
from Western technology during the cold-war period and suddenly exposed to this technology 
after the fall of the iron curtain. Hence, there is a large and suddenly arising potential for 
technology spillovers. Still, the overall education level of the workforce is very high such that 
there is a fertile ground for technology adoption. 2) The labor market of Hungary is quite   4
liberal and factor prices flexible. 3) Hungary is open to FDI such that technology transfer 
could occur on large scale. 
 
Our results on the wage profile are in contrast to several other unpublished studies on 
employee-employer matched data. Heyman et al. (2004) and Martins (2003) find no 
difference in wage setting of MNEs and indigenous firms from Sweden and Portugal, 
respectively. Görg et al. (2002) finds a positive wage premium for workers who are trained by 
MNEs in Ghana but there is only an insignificant fall in the wage premium directly after a 
worker joins an MNE.
4 Kertesi and Köllő (2001), while sharing the same database with this 
study, do not deal with foreign takeovers. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 develops a theoretical model; section 3 
describes the data and the macroeconomic environment of Hungary; section 4 contains the 
empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2) An FDI Technology Spillover and Learning Model 
In this section, we develop a theoretical model that serves the purpose of deriving observable 
conditions to test indirectly for unobservable spillover and learning effects. 
 
2.1) Model Set-up 
There are two time periods t=1,2. We consider an economy with 2 sectors i=1,2 in addition to 
a “rest of the economy”. Goods are homogeneous within each sector. There is one production 
factor labor with differences in efficiency across workers. There is also one MNE (M) with 
particularly efficient technology (e.g. patent holder), fixed cost and constant marginal cost. 
The MNE exists only in sector 1. In all sectors operates a competitive fringe of symmetric 
                                                 
4 Görg et al. (2002) provides a theoretical model of rent sharing that also explains wage premia.   5
potential indigenous firms. There is free firm entry and exit at any time of all competitive 
fringe firms which have ex ante identical CRS technology across all sectors. Also workers are 
identical within each firm. In this setting, limit pricing will occur (Murphy et al., 1989). 
 
Workers are initially identical and allocate to the MNE and active indigenous firms. 
Henceforth, we call MNE-trained workers those with MNE experience in period 1. There are 
three alternative moves τ  of MNE-trained workers: (a) τ =N1: MNE-trained workers move to 
an indigenous firm in sector 1; (b) τ =M: no worker turnover; (c) τ =N2: MNE-trained 
workers move to indigenous firms in sector 2. We refer for simplicity to τ  also as a regime. 
 
Firms maximize their profits  () τ π , t
F : 
() () ( )( ) ( ) [ ] τ τ τ τ τ π , , , , ,
1 t w t A t P t x t
F F
i
F F ⋅ − ⋅ =
−  (1) 
with i=1,2 denoting the sector index, t the time index, F∈{M,N1,N2} the firm index,  ( ) τ , t x
F  
the firm-specific demand in units,  ( ) τ , t P i  the price in sector i at time t in regime τ , and 
() τ , t w
F  the corresponding wage. For example,  ( ) F w
F , 2  is the wage rate of firm type F, 
when the MNE-trained worker is hired in period 2 by this firm. 
 
Total factor productivity (TFP)  () τ , t A
F  consists of two components: 




, 2 1 = ∈ ⋅ = t N N M t A t A t A
W
F
F F τ τ τ τ  (2) 
There is an F-firm specific asset  ( ) τ ,
~
t A
F  at time t in regimeτ . We assume that workers 
cannot contract their marginal productivity based on any firm-specific knowledge assets that 
provide an above-common-practice productivity. When leaving the firm, workers cannot 
transfer this firm-specific component of productivity. There is also a worker-specific 




F  in regime τ  at time t of a worker initially allocating to firm F. 
This productivity component is fully contractable by workers. The multiplication of the two   6
productivity components in equation (2) implies that high-quality workers are relatively more 
productive in high-tech than in low-tech firms. 
 
We conclude the discussion of technology by giving the initial conditions on the two 
productivity components in each regime, firm type, and worker type: 
()A A
i N = τ , 1
~  (3) 
()A t A
M = τ ,
~  (4) 
()A A
W = τ τ , 1
~  (5) 
() A N A i
W
M = , 2
~  (6) 
() A N A j
Ni = , 2
~  (7) 
for all  {} j i j i t N N M ≠ = = ∈ ; 2 , 1 , ; 2 , 1 ; , , 2 1 τ  and with  A A< < 0 . There is a common-
practice technology level  A that applies both to the productivity component of workers and 
local firms initially and remains in place, whenever workers are not exposed to MNEs, and 
local firms are not hiring workers that have MNE experience. Instead, the MNE firm-
component of productivity  A is above the common-practice level. 
 
Next, we introduce learning from MNEs into the model: 
() L A A
W ⋅ = τ τ , 2
~  (8) 
for all  {} 2 1, , N N M ∈ τ . Condition (8) describes a productivity gain of workers through 
learning from MNEs over time. It corresponds to the dynamic FDI learning model by Findlay 
(1978). Importantly, learning occurs only one period after having joined the MNE. 
 
In contrast, we consider also a technological knowledge spillover effect: 
() i i
N S A N A
i ⋅ = , 2
~  (9)   7
for i=1,2. Condition (9) describes technological knowledge spillovers from MNE-trained 
workers to domestic firms. Learning results in an equal productivity gain of employing MNE-
trained workers in both MNEs and indigenous firms. Knowledge spillovers, instead, imply 
differential productivity gains from hiring MNE-trained workers that accrue only to 
indigenous firms, but not to the MNE. Knowledge spillovers, instead, imply that MNE-trained 
workers contribute more to indigenous firm than to MNE productivity. 
 
Assumption 1: Lack of absorptive capacity of workers. 
A A L / 1 < <  (10) 
 
Assumption 1 ensures that the superior technology of the MNE is not entirely transferred to 
its workers. 
 
Assumption 2: Technological proximity condition. 
L S S < ≤ ≤ 1 2 1  for i=1,2.  (11) 
 
The knowledge spillover from an MNE can occur both to domestic firms within the same 
sector or even in some other sector. However, knowledge spillovers across sectors may 
become weaker. A value of 1 implies the absence of any knowledge spillover that shall be 
discussed, as well. The strict inequality implies a lack of willingness of indigenous firms to 
adopt to new technology, because its workers have already been learning L by assumption but 
the firm asset may still remain below that productivity level, for example, because the 
management blocks innovation to secure its power within the organization. 
 
Assumption 3: No-leapfrogging condition. 
A A S L / 1 1 < ⋅ <  (12) 
   8
This condition ensures that even an indigenous firm equipped with former MNE workers does 
not have a technology superior to the MNE when operating with untrained workers. 
 
Finally, we turn to the numeraire sector “rest of the economy”. There is a CRS technology 
with total factor productivity 
2 A , perfect competition, and MNEs are absent. There is inter-
sectoral labor mobility. Hence, equation (1) implies together with the zero profit condition 
due to free entry and exit that the wage for workers with productivity 
2 A  is 
2 A . 
 
Bertrand competition on goods market i=1,2 yields limit pricing, i.e. the firm with the larger 
profits will compete the other firm type out of the market: 
() () { } ( ) ( ) { } τ π τ π τ π τ π , ; , 0 , ; ,
1 1 t t Max t t Min
N M N M ≤ <  (13) 
for t=1,2 and  {} 2 1, , N N M ∈ τ  at strictly positive output. Since only one firm is active in each 
sector, output of the active firm equals goods market demand which is assumed to be a 
function of prices xi(Pi) in sector i with xi’(Pi )<0. Since there exist many firms that can obtain 
workers with productivity 
2 A  at wage 
2 A , and free entry and exit ensure that profits are 
competed away, there is an upper limit price in the product market of sector 1 such that 
() 1 , ≤ τ t P i  for i=1,2; t=1,2 and  {} 2 1, , N N M ∈ τ . (14) 
Since a MNE-trained worker can always work in the position of an untrained one in an 
indigenous firm at wage 
2 A , there is a lower bound on the wage of trained workers: 
()
2 , 2 A w ≥ τ
τ  for  { } 2 1, , N N M ∈ τ . (15) 
Free labor mobility across sectors
5 implies also that untrained workers must be indifferent in 
period 1 of whether to start working in an MNE with the option to get trained and possibly 
                                                 
5 Görg et al. (2002) developes a rent-sharing model that explains wage premia of workers in foreign-owned 
firms, when workers learn slowly over time. By assumption, the return to human capital accumulation is larger 
in foreign firms. To the extent that workers are able to share in the surplus of the higher return to human capital 
through bargaining, wages in foreign-owned firms rise above the ones in indigenous firms. Görg et al. (2002) 
deviate in two crucial assumptions from the present model: there is no worker mobility across sectors and there 
is a lock-in effect in the sense that workers cannot be instantaneously replaced by untrained ones. Such a model 
is very suitable to describe conclave economies, where MNEs form a modern sector on their own, while the   9
switch in the second period to an indigenous firm or whether to remain over both periods in 
an indigenous firm earning the wage 
2 A  (Lazear-condition):
6, 7 
() () ( ) ( )
2 ) 1 ( , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 A R M w R M w w R w
i i N N M ⋅ + = ⋅ + = ⋅ + τ τ
τ  (16) 
for  {} 2 1, , N N M ∈ τ  and i=1,2. R denotes the discount factor and we assume in this section a 
perfect capital market without borrowing constraints. Condition (16) implies immediately that 
workers cannot benefit from the presence of MNEs in terms of their life-time income. There 
is one restriction on free labor mobility: trained workers can leave the MNE only at an 
additional marginal cost χ, χ→0
+, which is proportional to output of the firm. This cost will be 
born in equilibrium by the indigenous firm that hires the MNE-trained worker.
8 
 
2.2) Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
The above model constitutes a game, where the players are the three firm types M, N1, N2, 
and the MNE-trained workers. Their actions are the setting of wages and prices and the labor 
allocation decision, respectively. Firms set wages before deciding upon their product prices. 
Wage offers are made simultaneously and workers have complete information on all offers. 
 
A subgame perfect equilibrium of the game (1)-(16) is defined as a vector of wages, labor 
allocation in period 2, and product prices over both periods such that neither period 2 profits 
nor the asset price of any firm can increase by deviating, and no MNE-trained worker can 
improve wage income in period 2.
9  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
traditional sector of indigenous firms is technologicaly so remote that workers cannot be substituted across 
sectors. Görg et al. (2002) apply their model consequently to data of Ghana. 
6 Otherwise, either all workers would supply their work to the MNE or exclusively to indigenous firms. Both 
cannot constitute an equilibrium with MNEs active. 
7 Condition (6) was first used in Lazear (1979) to show that efficiency wage problems can be solved with a steep 
wage schedule over lifetime, whenever there exists a mandatory retirement age. 
8 The nature of the cost is not important for the model results in this paper. It is only important that some cost 
exists - even if negligibly small – to ensure uniqueness of equilibria. Letting this cost be marginal intends to 
make these cost relevant for individual decisions, but not for the overall welfare evaluation of a country, as 
moving cost should not have a significant negative impact on GDP. 
9 Note that only MNE-trained workers act strategically, while inexperienced workers have no strategic choices.   10
As usual, the model is solved by backward induction. For solving the Nash equilibrium in 
period 2, it is useful to define the maximum offer  ( ) τ
τ , 2 ˆ w  that a firm type τ is willing to make 















N N M l w
, 2 sup , 2 , 2 inf arg , 2 ˆ
2 1, , , 2
τ τ τ
τ
τ π τ π τ π τ
τ . (7) 
The trained worker will end up in the firm T that is willing to make the highest offer: 
{}
() { } τ
τ
τ
, 2 ˆ sup arg
2 1, ,
w T
N N M ∈
= , (8) 
Conveniently, (18) is sufficient to constitute a Nash equilibrium of the end game. Analogue to 
the theory on second-price sealed-bid auctions, the trained MNE worker will, however, only 
be paid marginally more than the second highest bid. 
 
The intuition is straight forward: when firm N1 wants to hire the MNE-trained worker, it 
needs to outcompete the MNE first according to (13). This requires to set the goods price so 
low that the MNE would make losses when hiring an untrained worker at period 2, i.e. 
() ( ) ε − = A A N p / , 2 1 1 , (19) 
where 
+ → 0 ,ε ε  is a value that is marginally positive. However, then the maximum bid that 
firm N1 is able to make without making losses itself is: 




1 / , 2 ˆ
1 A S L A A A N w
N < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − = χ ε . (20) 
Because of the inequality in (20) which contradicts (15), the firm N1 will never be able to hire 
MNE-trained workers. Instead, the highest bid of the MNE is: 
()
2 2 , 2 ˆ A L A M w
M > ⋅ =  (21) 
The MNE is willing to pay for the learning gain L in productivity, when the worker is trained. 
The MNE does not compensate the entire marginal productivity of the worker, because hiring 
an unskilled worker will become more profitable in this case. Still, the highest bid stems from 
firm N2, whenever there exists some positive technology spillover externality (S2>1):   11
() () χ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = 1 , 2 ˆ 2
2
2
2 S L A N w
N . (22) 
The reason is an advantage in form of the technology spillover term S2 that firm N2 has over 
the MNE, if an MNE-trained worker is hired. Unless there is no technology spillover for N2 
firms from hiring MNE-trained workers, the N2 firm will outbid the MNE and pay marginally 
more than what the MNE would have been prepared to pay:  ε + ⋅L A
2 . If, instead, there is no 
technology spillover effect (S2=1), then the MNE wins the bidding competition, because it 
does not bear moving costs χ, and offers marginally more than the second-highest bid of firm 
N2:  () χ − ⋅ ⋅ 1
2 L A . In both cases, the wage of the MNE-trained worker is about  L A ⋅
2 . Note 
that this wage rate is above the one otherwise found in the economy for the same position. 
 
From the Lazear condition (16) follows that the wage that the MNE pays to its workers in the 
first period must be below the one that prevails otherwise in the economy for the same 
position. The Lazear condition is graphically displayed in Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The Figure 1 depicts wages in periods t=1 and t=2, when enjoying training at an MNE or 
without. No matter whether the worker remains in the MNE or not, there will be a higher 
salary of this worker after training. However, the MNE is able to fully internalize the learning 
effect by discounting period 1 wages of its workers by the expected learning gain. If there is 
no spillover externality (S2=1), then the MNE-trained workers remain in the MNE and this 
gives rise to a U-shape wage profile. MNEs pay less to new workers and more to MNE-
trained ones than indigenous firms for comparable occupations to prevent trained workers 
from being hired away and draining knowledge to competitors. If there is a technology 
spillover externality (S2>1), instead, then the MNE wage cost are below average, because the 
period 1 wage discount prevails but the MNE pays market rates to its newly hired workers in   12
period 2, while there is huge worker turnover of MNE-trained workers to indigenous firms 
that operate in another market. We summarize the above findings in proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: (i) There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium T,  {} 2 1, , N N M T ∈ , to 
the game (1)-(16) such that there will be worker turnover from the MNE to firm N2 if there 
are technology spillover externalities from the MNE-trained worker to firm N2 beyond pure 













T    (23) 
(ii) The MNE offers a wage for a workplace in period 1 below the one of indigenous firms if 
there exists a technology spillover from MNE-trained workers to firm N2 (S2>1). Otherwise, 
MNE wages will be below this benchmark in period 1 and above in period 2. 
(iii) There exists a direct net benefit through the MNE to the host country if and only if there 
exists a technology spillover from MNE-trained workers to firm N2 (S2>1). There is no net 
benefit to the host country from learning alone. 
Proof: Available on request.  q.e.d. 
 
A comment is due on the welfare effects of potential takeovers. The presence of multinational 
firms causes productivity of domestic workers to rise. This is not sufficient, however, for 
constituting a net benefit to the host country, because MNEs are able to internalize the 
learning effect and the discounted life-time income of workers is not affected by foreign 
takeovers. It is the circumstance that an MNE-trained worker contributes more to domestic 
firms’ than to MNEs’ productivity which is exploited to create a net benefit to the host 
country. By the well-known second-price sealed-bid auction argument, the MNE-trained 
worker is not able to internalize the incremental benefit that she brings to a domestic firm 
relative to the MNE. But then the MNE has no possibility to cash in this spillover externality. 
   13
Next we discuss assumption perturbations and their impact on the model results. Contrary to 
Markusen (2001), Fosfuri et al. (2001), and Glass and Saggi (2002), there is no export option 
to the MNE. In our context, the MNE will never choose to export at the price of additional 
transport cost to prevent knowledge spillovers, because the MNE is able to fully internalize 
the learning externality. Hence, the model results are not affected by including an exporting 
option. However, other assumption perturbations change the equilibrium in some respects. 
 
A) Additional Sectors 
Suppose there exists many sectors such as sector 2. We denote the additional sectors i=3,..,n 
and assume that (7) and (9) hold for sectors i=3,..,n, as well. Moreover, we assume without 
loss of generality that Si≥Si+1≥1 for all i. Since, equation (22) still holds analogously: 
() () χ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = 1 , 2 ˆ
2
i i
N S L A N w
i , (24) 
The bidding competition for the MNE-trained worker is still won by firm N2. But the second 
highest bid stems from firm N3. Hence, the wage rate of the MNE-trained worker is: 
() () ε χ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = 1 , 2 3
2
2
2 S L A N w
N . (25) 
The fact that the MNE training is not uniquely useful for just one indigenous firm but for 
many allows the worker to internalize the technology spillover via the bidding competition. 
However, this allows in turn the MNE to internalize even (part of) the technology spillover 
effect by decreasing wages in the first period even further and the net benefit to the host 
country decreases. In fact, the profit of the firm N2 in period 2 is found to be: 
() ( ) [ ] 3
1
2 2 1 1 , 2
2 S S x N
N ⋅ − ⋅ =
− π , (26) 
which is positive if and only if  3 2 S S ≠ . Hence, there will only be a net benefit of a foreign 
takeover to the host country if the expected technology spillover effect is very specific to only 
one indigenous firm which is not directly competing with the MNE. However, then the scope 
of this effect is likely to be small. 
   14
B) Imperfect Capital Market 
Crucial for the strong result is the Lazear condition (16) which rests mainly on the hardly 
questionable assumption that learning takes time. However, the condition may break down if 
the assumption of a perfect capital market (free lending and borrowing) does not hold. To 
make a strong contrast, we assume complete lack of access of workers to the capital market. 
 
We discuss first the case, when workers are homogeneous in the time preference rate λ. Then, 
condition (16) will be replaced by: 
() () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 A U M w U M w U w U w U
i i N N M ⋅ + = ⋅ + = ⋅ + λ λ τ λ τ
τ  (27) 
for  {} 2 1, , N N M ∈ τ  and i=1,2, where U(.), U’(.)>0, U’’(.)<0, is the period utility function of a 
representative worker. Note that the end game will not change under condition (27) and thus 
the wage of MNE trained workers, when staying with the MNE, will be larger in period 2 than 
prevails in the rest of the economy for a well-defined occupation (i.e.  ()
2 , 2 A M w
M > ). 
Hence, by the monotony of the utility function, it is still true that 
() () M w M w
M M , 1 , 2 > . (28) 
Workers still do not experience a welfare gain from foreign takeovers, because condition (27) 
requires the welfare of workers to be balanced, when either working for an MNE or not. The 
host country benefits only from foreign takeovers, if a technology spillover effect cannot be 
internalized by workers and some indigenous firm can increase its profits. 
 
Next, we drop the assumption of a homogeneous time preference rate. Let there be m workers 
in the economy with time preference rates  m λ λ λ > > > ... 2 1 . Moreover, labor supply is 
exogenous and normalized to 1 and to make the case interesting  ( ) 1 1
2 > ⋅
− A x , i.e. the MNE 
will have to hire more than one worker. Integer problems will be evaded by assuming that a 
worker can partially supply her work to an indigenous firm and partially to an MNE.   15
Additionally, we assume that the MNE cannot observe the time preference rate of its workers. 
Now, equation (16) is replaced by (29): 
() () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 A U M w U M w U w U w U
i i N N M ⋅ + = ⋅ + = ⋅ + λ λ τ λ τ
τ , (29) 
where λ  is defined as the worker with smallest time preference still required to work for the 
MNE (formally:  () () { }
2 1 max
− ⋅ ≤ = A x i i λ λ  ). The MNE will offer a wage schedule over time 
that corresponds to (29). By self-selection, only workers i with time preference  λ λ ≥ i  will 
join the MNE. Hence, some workers will actually benefit from joining the MNE, because 
() () ( ) () ( ) ( )
2 1 , 2 , 1 A U w U w U i
M ⋅ + > ⋅ + λ τ λ τ
τ  if  λ λ > i . This is indeed another source of a net 
benefit to the host country. Such a gain rests on the MNE being an imperfect substitute to a 
functioning capital market. Since only the most patient workers would self-select to work for 
the MNE, the implied interest rate λ  would likely be below the market interest rate R if a 
perfect capital market existed. Hence, the MNE is able to charge lower wages in period 1 
compared to the case of the otherwise identical model with a perfect capital market. 
 
Yet another qualification has to be made: if worker utility  ( )
2 A U  is at the subsistence level or 
if there is a conclave economy with a highly developed foreign-owned sector, an 
underdeveloped informal sector, and no labor mobility in between, then our model does not 
apply. This may be the case for developing countries. Then, the learning and rent-sharing 
model of Görg et al. (2002) may be more appropriate. 
 
C) More Time Periods 
There is an artefact in the previous model that results from the assumption that the game ends 
after period 2. An untrained worker employed by the MNE in period 2 does not enjoy any 
learning benefits in the future. Hence, the MNE cannot discount the wage in period 2. To 
avoid this artefact, we assume that firms exist forever, but workers only for 2 periods. The   16
time index t denotes now the two life periods young and old of a worker of a generation. The 
full game is an infinite repetition of these two life periods. Then, MNEs will always hire the 
young generation, because only young workers benefit from learning in the next period. 
 
Under these assumptions the game solution changes only in one respect: the MNE can hire in 
regime τ=Ni, i=1,2, an untrained young worker at the wage w
M(1,Ni) in t=2, which will be 
below the rate 
2 A  that prevails elsewhere in the market for untrained workers. Intuitively, this 
will lower the maximum offer that the MNE is willing to pay for the trained worker during 
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Still, this is larger than what firm N1 would be willing to offer which is below 
2 A . The 
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The term on the right hand side of the inequality in (31) is smaller than L, and MNE-trained 
workers will normally move to firm N2, even when the technology spillover effect is absent 
(S2=1). Interestingly, the local firm that hires MNE-trained workers increases its productivity, 
but there is still no welfare gain to the host country without technology spillover externality 
and U-shaped wage profile. The empirical FDI literature investigates such productivity 
increases, e.g. Aitken and Harrison (1999). In the light of our model, this is not sufficient to 
conclude on FDI technology spillover effects and host country welfare gains. 
 
D) Cournot Competition 
The results so far are obtained from a model that assumes Bertrand competition. Next, we 
show that our results are also obtained from a simple Cournot oligopoly model. To keep the   17
analysis short, we assume that there is an MNE affiliate M, one indigenous firm N in the same 
sector and in addition the “rest of the economy”. Moreover, we assume a linear goods market 
demand function: p=a-b(x
M+x
N) with parameters a, b such that  A A a / 2− >  and b>0.
10 
Otherwise, the assumptions of the benchmark model are sustained. 
 
It is straightforward to find the maximum offer that an MNE affiliate is willing to make for 
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The maximum wage offer will be  L A
2 , if there are no FDI technology spillover externalities 














/ 2 ˆ . (33) 
It is easily seen from (32) and (33) that the bidding competition for MNE-trained workers is 
won by the indigenous firms if and only if technology spillover externalities exist (S1>1). 
Otherwise, the MNE offers the same wage as the indigenous firm but MNE-trained workers 
can avoid the marginal moving costs χ and stay with the MNE. Formally, result (23) applies 
also in the case of Cournot competition. 
 
This result is in contrast to Glass and Saggi (2002), although both models are Cournot 
duopolies. Notably, the deviating assumption of our model – learning takes time – changes 
not only the first stage of the game but also the last one (period 2). If learning occurs 
instantaneously, instead, then the MNE looses its outside option to hire an untrained worker, 
because every employee is immediately trained by assumption. This change of the game is 
sufficient to exclude the outcome that the indigenous firm wins the bidding competition even 
                                                 
10 The restriction on a is a sufficient condition to ensure that no natural monopoly emerges. This condition is also 
necessary if S1=L=1.   18
without technology spillover externalities in the case of a large technology gap. The Lazear 
condition (16) and the fact that the wage in period 2 is at least  L A
2 >
2 A  ensures that the U-
shaped wage pattern continues to hold. 
 
Turning to the welfare effects, there arises a slight modification compared to the previous 
models. With Cournot competition, price effects arise from technology spillover effects that 






















Since the learning effect L does not appear in (34), the host country does not have an increase 
of its consumer rent from learning alone. A contrasting result emerges, however, from FDI 
technology spillovers (S1>1). The larger the technology spillover externality S1, the more 
decreases the product price and the larger is the gain of the host country in consumer rent. 






















N π  (35) 
However, they rise with the extent of technology spillover externalities (S1>1). 
 
Summing up, in a simple model of Cournot competition our results are mostly qualitatively 
sustained. The only major deviation to the previous analysis stems from an additional channel 
besides indigenous-firm profits through which the host country can benefit from technology 




                                                                                                                                                          
11 Calculations are available from the authors upon request. 
12 This fall in product prices due to technology spillover externalities is additional to the effect that new MNEs 
increase product market competition and drive down profit mark-ups.   19
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we formulate the testing hypotheses that have 
emerged from the theoretical model. Since we cannot follow workers in our data when 
changing firms, we re-interpret the incidence of worker turnover as firm takeover. Whenever 
a firm is taken over by foreign investors, all its workforce has changed status from working in 
a firm with domestic owners to one with foreign owners. With this qualification the model 
can be applied to our data. We formulate as H0 the hypothesis that there are no significant 
direct benefits from technology spillover externalities to Hungary. The first HA (HA1) will be 
that the regime of the model applies where such net benefits arise. The second HA (HA2) will 
be that the model of Fosfuri et al. (2001) applies. 
 
In particular, the H0 describes an immediate drop of wages relative to the counterfactual of no 
takeover and a recovery in subsequent years. Moreover, worker turnover drops after takeover 
and productivity is rising slowly in the years after takeover. Instead, the HA1 suggests a 
permanent drop of wages after foreign takeover below the counterfactual, a rise in worker 
turnover, and a rise in firm productivity. Finally, the HA2 requires that a positive wage 
premium arises immediately after takeover, productivity jumps up, and worker turnover falls. 
Hence, the three observations on wages, productivity, and worker turnover are sufficient to 
discriminate unambiguously among the three hypotheses.  Next, we turn to the empirical 




3.1) Macroeconomic Background 
Hungary opened up to foreign investors earlier than most other Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC) both by large-scale privatization and by introducing a liberal regime for 
greenfield investment. The FDI/GDP ratio reached over 40 % in 2001, which is close to the   20
50% of Ireland and well above the EU average (UNCTAD, 2001). In the same year, 27% of 
the workforce in the business sector is employed in MNEs. An important factor behind the 
growth of inward-FDI is a generous investment incentive scheme including, among others, 
tax breaks, free trade zones for individual firms, grants, and loan guarantees
13.  
 
In the year 1995, a stabilization program was implemented. There was a significant rise in the 
tariffs for imports, a crawling-peg devaluation of the national currency, and the privatization 
of the state-property in telecommunication-, electrical-, banking- and insurance industries, 
among others. GDP growth was accelerating after the reform program from 1997 onwards. 
Hence, we will have to control for time breaks by appropriate tests and time-fixed effects. 
Importantly, the typical post-transition slump of the economy is outside our data period and 
does not interfere with our analysis. 
 
The Hungarian collective bargaining system is mainly firm based.
14 About 10% of the 
workforce is organized in trade unions industry-wide and about 30% on firm level (Héthy, 
2002, p. 11, and Neumann, 2000, p.52). Hence, there are no significant institutions that 
prevent wages below a nation-wide average. This is in contrast to the studies of Martins 
(2003) and Heyman et al. (2004) on Portugal and Sweden, respectively, where wages are 
much more inflexible.  
 
3.2) Data Description 
Our analysis is based on the Hungarian „Structure of Earnings Survey” (SES). The SES data 
have been collected by the Hungarian Employment Office. The SES is a cross-section random 
sample of employees that contains detailed information about monthly gross earnings which 
                                                 
13 Interestingly, foreign-owned firms’ share in pre-tax profits (around 65 %) is at least five times as high as their 
share in corporate profit taxes (around 12 %), indicating  generous tax breaks for foreign investors (OECD, 
2002, p. 111 ff).   21
includes monthly gross basic wage including ordinary allowances (overtime or nightshift 
allowances) and 1/12 part of the unordinary premium received in the last year. The data 
collection occurred in May of every third year in 1986, 1989 and 1992, and from 1992 on 
every year. Since Hungary was not a market economy in earlier sample years, we consider 
only data from 1992 until the most recent year 2001. 
 
A random sample is drawn from all employees in firms with a minimum threshold number of 
20 employees. We restrict ourselves also to employees in the manufacturing sector as in 
Aitken et al. (1996). 
 
Unfortunately, we are unable to follow an individual across years. However, we are able to 
follow firms across years. Hence, we pool all annual cross section employee data which are 
connected across years by their firm identifier. This distinguishes our data from Kertesi and 
Köllő (2001) which studies wages and foreign-owned firms in independent annual cross-
section datasets. If no worker is drawn randomly in a year from a firm, then it disappears from 
our sample in this year. However, thanks to the large size of the SES samples (6-7% of total 
employment among the covered firm-size) there is a high probability that at least one 
employee of a firm reappears in subsequent years. Indeed, the average number of observations 
per firm is 5.6 out of a maximum of 10. Summing up, our employee data are representative 
for Hungarian manufacturing employees in firms with more than 20 employees, but small 
firms may be under-sampled, as they form shorter panels, because the probability is larger 
that none of its workers is drawn into the sample for some years. 
 
Using the firm identifier
15, balance sheet and profit and loss account data are merged into the 
employee dataset.
16 In particular, we have information on the called-up share of capital and 
                                                                                                                                                          
14 However, all workers are covered with a statutory minimum wage which is bargained yearly on a tripartit 
forum of employees, employers, and state. This minimum wage is mostly below market rates.   22
the equity share of different types of owners (foreign, domestic private or state ownership
17). 
We define a firm to be foreign owned if the share of foreign owners in the called-up share of 
capital exceeds 50%. Three types of foreign-owned firms appear in our dataset. First, a firm 
appears in our sample with less than 50% foreign equity participation and turns in a latter year 
into a firm with more than 50% foreign equity participation. We call these firms foreign 
takeovers of domestic firms.
18 Second, a firm appears in the first year of its sample life as a 
foreign owned one, but its foreign participation rate drops below 50% in a subsequent year. 
We call these firms domestic takeovers of foreign-owned firms. Third, firms enter the dataset 
with a participation rate above 50% and stay this way throughout their sample life. 
Unfortunately, we cannot be sure whether these firms are greenfield investments, although 
many of them probably are. Particularly, if a firm of the third type is small, it may not have 
been sampled before, although it existed. But then, this firm may have experienced an 
ownership change outside the sample and thus may be a foreign takeover. Moreover, we 
know for some years whether a worker was previously employed in a firm. We find 
frequently foreign-owned firms that enter our sample but employed already at least one 
worker in previous years. Hence, there may be additional takeovers among those firms that 
we observe as foreign-owned throughout their sample life. However, we can be sure about all 
cases that we identify as foreign  takeovers. 
 
A particular problem is multiple ownership change in the case of 63 firms (3856 
observations). Quite often this multiple ownership change was erratic due to foreign 
                                                                                                                                                          
15 The firm identifier of our dataset is identical with the firm registration code used by the Hungarian Tax and 
Financial Control Administration and therefore very reliable. 
16 We thank Jozsef Becsei from ECOSTAT in Hungary and his colleagues for their help in collecting the firm 
data. 
17 Hardly any foreign takeovers of state-owned firms occured in our sample. Privatization of manufacturing 
occured by and large before our sample period. 
18 Originally, the firm identifier – firm fiscal code – changed if a completely new owner took over a company, 
but stayed the same if the foreign owner had previously a minority stake. However, Gábor Kőrösi of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences was able to identify fiscal code changes of existing plants and we used this 
information for identifying takeovers. Unfortunately, in the years 1995, 1996 and 1998 this procedure was not 
possible.   23
ownership participation rates close to 50% in general and some years slightly above and 
others below. Since it is not obvious how to classify these cases, we decided to exclude these 
observations (about 1% of our sample). Their small number cannot possibly affect our results. 
 
Turning to the control variables, we have gender, experience
19, 4 categories of education 
levels (primary school-, vocational school-, secondary school participation, and higher 
education), 3 occupation categories (blue collar, white collar non-managerial, white collar 
managerial)
20 or a 4-digit occupation code (HSCO-93) with 532 categories
21, average labour 
productivity (value added per worker)
 22, capital intensity
23, the share of white collar workers 
in total firm employment, operating profits, and a 2-digit NACE industry code. Moreover, we 
apply in all regressions a firm size category code with the five firm size categories 21-50, 51-
300, 301-1000, 1001-3000, and more than 3000 employees per firm
24. In addition, we have a 
region code which captures 7 Hungarian NUTS 2 regions which are further divided into 
countryside, cities, and county capitals. Fortunately the region code is based on plant location 
rather than firm-headquarter information. Hence, the region code is quite reliable.
25 
 
We have 346674 full-time employee observations of 7198 different firms in our ten-year 
panel all together. The number of the sampled firms increases from 2189 to 2925 over the 
years, the number of employee observations in a year from 30093 to 37473. This reflects both 
the growth of the Hungarian economy as well as the increasing significance of inward FDI. 
Table 1 shows the decomposition of firm types within our sample in each year. There are 214 
foreign takeovers of domestic firms (6958 employee observations in the year of takeover), 
                                                 
19 Age minus years spent in school minus common entry age into school (6 years). See Kertesi and Köllő (2001) 
for the precise definition. 
20 See Kertesi and Köllő (2001) for the precise definitions. 
21 The 4-digit occupation code changed after 1993 and is not compatible with previous years. Whenever applying 
4-digit occupation fixed effects regressions, our dataset will be reduced to the years 1994-2001. 
22 The nominal values (in Hungarian Forint) were deflated with the official Consumers Price Index published by 
the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. Source is Fazekas (2003). 
23 Capital intensity is calculated as book value of fixed assets per employee. 
24 See Oi and Idson (1999) for a review on the evidence that firm size explains wages.   24
and 125 domestic takeovers of foreign-owned firms (2117 employee observations in the year 
of ownership change). Foreign takeovers are more or less evenly spread over the sample 
period and we do not expect any disturbances of our results from particular events or the 
sample window. 
 




4.1) Foreign-owned Firms and Wages 
We first replicate a standard wage regression for Hungary as in Kertesi and Köllő (2001) 
which explains monthly gross wages of a worker by her education, experience, occupation, 
gender, average firm labour productivity, capital intensity, firm size, year-, region- and 
industry dummies. In addition, the variable of interest is a dummy with value 1 whenever an 
employee is working for a foreign-owned firm. The result is displayed in Table 2, 
specification (1). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
We confirm the result of Kertesi and Kollő (2001) on the same data and even the results of 
Aitken et al. (1996) on a worker survey rather than firm data; there is a wage premium paid by 
foreign-owned firms over the one of indigenous firms of 15 % even after controlling for 
worker and firm characteristics. The coefficients of the control variables are as expected. 
Gross wages are the higher the better the education, the higher a firms’ average labour 
productivity and its capital intensity. Moreover, there is a typical non-linear relation between 
                                                                                                                                                          
25 See Fazekas (2000) for a description of this region code and the regional Hungarian inward FDI pattern.   25
gross wages and job-experience. Male workers earn about 22% more than female workers and 
white-collar more than blue-collar workers. 
 
In deviation from Kertesi and Köllő (2001), we pool observations on all years together. 
Hence, we check for a structural break of our results over time. Since there was a break in 
GDP growth, we present in specification (2) and (3) of Table 2 results on observations until 
1998 and after 1998, respectively. While some coefficients of control variables differ across 
the two sample halves, the coefficient on the foreign-ownership dummy does not. We also 
estimated the wage premium for each year separately and found a variation between 14% and 
16% (not reported in the Tables). Hence, we are confident that pooling all observations across 
years does not affect the estimates on our variable of interest. 
 
Next, we investigate whether the wage-premium may stem from MNEs having a different 
employment structure than indigenous firms. For example, MNEs may undertake more 
specialized production steps due to intra-firm specialization and apply over-proportionately 
many workers for who learning-by-doing is more important than formal training. Then the 
wage premium may pick up the effect from MNE specialization in high-skilled, but low-
formal-training jobs. When adding fixed effects for 532 occupations, however, the wage 
premium not only does not disappear, it even remains the same (specification (4) of Table 2). 
 
One of the possible explanations for the wage premium of MNEs is due to some unobservable 
firm characteristic that is particularly frequent among MNEs. For example, MNEs may 
frequently produce high-quality goods and pay a premium for a particular care that workers 
apply at their work. Abowd et al. (1999) found on French firm and worker survey data that 
gross wages depend both on unobserved worker characteristics and on unobserved firm 
characteristics. While we cannot implement worker fixed effects without worker-identifier, 
we introduce in specification (5) of Table 4 firm fixed effects without the foreign-ownership   26
dummy. We observe that firm-fixed effects increase the R
2 from 0.56 to 0.67. Hence, there 
may exist some firms that follow a high-wage policy and others a low-wage policy. 
 
Finally, we add the foreign-ownership dummy in specification (6) of Table 2 to the 
specification (5) with firm fixed effects. Now, we need to be careful in the interpretation of 
this dummy. Since there are firm-fixed effects and ownership is a firm characteristic, the 
foreign-ownership dummy explains only wage differentials between these domestic and 
foreign-owned firms that change their ownership status in the sample. Surprisingly, the wage 
premium drops substantially to a mere 3% while still remaining significant at the 1% level. 
This result suggests that takeovers behave fundamentally different to foreign-owned firms in 
general and will thus be the focus of the rest of this study. 
 
4.2) Takeovers and Wages 
So far, we found that ownership change between domestic and foreign investors may be 
correlated with the wage premium, but it is neither possible to follow the time-profile of a 
takeover firm nor to distinguish the two directions of ownership change. Hence, we consider 
next the wage premium of foreign takeovers one year before the ownership change, the year 
of the ownership change, one year thereafter, two years thereafter, and three and more years 
thereafter. Ownership change is noticed by the change of foreign participation in firm equity 
from below 50% to above, when comparing one end-year balance sheet to the previous one.
26 
Specification (1) of Table 3 includes these takeover dummy variables together with the 
control variables that were already used in Table 2. However, the control variables are 
suppressed from now on to ease presentation of the results. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
                                                 
26 We consider  only observations with firms that remain at least more than two years after takeover in the 
sample to alleviate window-end problems. See Heyman et al. (2004) for a similar proceeding.   27
 
Foreign-takeover firms have already an 11% wage premium before takeover compared to the 
average Hungarian manufacturing firm even after controlling for employee-, location-, 
industry-, and firm characteristics. This indicates the presence of some unobservable 
characteristics of their labor force that motivates them to pay higher wages. For example, 
particularly talented workers may be hired by those firms that become later takeover targets. 
The wage premium may reflect the particular (unobservable) quality of the workforce. A 
similar result is found by Heyman et al. (2004) for Sweden. We do not further investigate the 
reason for the wage premium before takeover in this study. 
 
It is stunning that the wage-premium actually drops right after the foreign takeover by about 
6%. Only in subsequent years, the wage premium rises slightly above the level before the 
takeover which explains why there is a small wage premium of foreign-owned firms when 
controlling for firm-fixed effects in the previous table. Wald-tests confirm the significance of 
the wage drop directly after takeover and the wage rise, when comparing them three or more 
years after takeover with one year thereafter. Such a U-shaped wage profile before and after a 
foreign takeover is in line with the regime of our theoretical model, when the host country 
does not benefit directly from technology spillover effects (H0). This result is, however, in 
strong contrast to the previous literature (HA2) which suggests that foreign-owned firms pay 
higher wages for comparable jobs and a foreign takeover implies a rise of wages, not a fall. 
 
In the same regression, we control also for domestic takeovers of foreign-owned firms. 
Foreign-takeover firms pay a wage premium larger than the average domestic takeover of 
previously foreign-owned firms, and the later a wage premium on the average domestically 
owned firm in the economy. There is no clear trend in the development of wages of domestic 
takeovers of foreign-owned firms. Still in the same regression, we include also dummies for 
those foreign-owned firms that may be greenfield investments or unverifiable foreign   28
takeovers. These firms have clearly the largest wage premium and it is even increasing the 
longer these firms are in the sample. This suggests that our findings remain restricted to 
foreign takeovers only, since greenfield investments may be different. 
 
Next, we add firm-fixed effects in specification (4) of Table 3.  The U-shape wage-premium 
time-profile of a takeover firm remains valid. Moreover, the long-run wage premium of 
acquired firms is substantially larger than their pre-takeover value. In addition, firm-fixed 
effects increase mildly the R
2 of the regression. A formal F-test confirms the significance of 
firm fixed effects. Specification (5) uses 532 occupation fixed effects instead of firm fixed 
effects, and specification (6) is an OLS estimator on the reduced sample size of specification 
(5) for comparison, because occupation coding is only available from 1994 onwards. The U-
shaped wage premium development before and after takeover remains virtually unchanged. 
 
Bertrand et al. (2004) argue in the context of the program evaluation literature that 
autocorrelation is a serious problem and recommend to apply the autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix of Arellano (1987). Moreover, our variables 
of interest vary only across firms and this causes the Moulton problem. Again, the problem is 
resolved by applying this covariance matrix. The results are displayed in Table 4. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Unfortunately, the standard errors of the estimated coefficients increase substantially 
indicating strong correlations of the error term of observations within a firm. As a result, the 
decrease of wages after takeover is no longer significant in the baseline specification (1). In 
contrast, the rise of wages over the years after the takeover is still highly significant. The 
same result is obtained, when adding occupation fixed effects in specification (2). To 
understand this result better, we distinguish newly hired workers one year after the takeover   29
from those who were employed by the firm already previous to the takeover. We find that the 
wage of newly hired workers is indeed significantly lower than a comparable wage before 
takeover. Instead, the wage decrease of workers already appointed at the firm previous to the 
takeover is marginally insignificant both when controlling for occupation fixed effects 
(specification 4) and without (specification 3). 
 
The strong wage discount of newly appointed workers right after a foreign takeover may have 
two explanations. First, there may be a composition change of the workforce in terms of 
unobservables. For example, if newly appointed workers have unfavorable characteristics 
unobservable to econometricians but observable to firms (e.g. talent), then wages of new 
workers appear to be discounted for a given occupation, education and experience level. It 
remains unclear though why MNEs would hire workers with unfavorable unobservable 
characteristics. Second, there may be long-lasting wage contracts. After a takeover, wages of 
previously employed workers cannot all immediately adjust due to fixed contracts, while this 
constraint does not apply to newly appointed workers. Although the latter explanation is more 
plausible we are not able to discriminate them. We focus in the following on establishing 
wage drops of previously employed workers right after a foreign takeover. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
In Table 5, we split the sample according to occupation and education. The first three 
specifications divide the sample in blue-collar, white-collar non-managerial, and white-collar 
managerial workers, respectively. Interestingly, we do not find a change of wages significant 
at the 5% level during the course of a takeover for blue-collar workers. This is in line with our 
theoretical model, because we would not expect that technology spillovers are relevant for 
this occupation group. Instead, we expect that higher positions or better educated staffs are 
subject to technology spillovers. Indeed, we find both a significant decline of wages after the   30
takeover and a rise again three years or later of white-collar non-managerial workers 
regardless of being newly appointed or not. A different pattern emerges again for white-collar 
managerial workers. There is a rise in the wages of newly hired ones after takeover contrary 
to the other worker types. We suspect that this increase of wages reflects foreign managers 
who come in as supervisors and are rewarded both for the discomfort of living abroad and the 
larger wage level that prevails in the home country of the foreign investor. Since there is no 
coding for nationality of workers, we are unable to exclude those observations from the 
sample and we have to keep in mind that this will bias results. 
 
The alternative sample split on education yields a very similar picture in specifications (4)-
(6). Workers with vocational training or less do not have a significant wage premium change 
during the course of the takeover. Employees with secondary education are subject to quite a 
strong and highly significant U-shaped wage premium profile during the course of a takeover, 
as do university-degree employees despite the problem with foreign managers.
27 
 
4.3) Controlling for Selection on Observables and Unobservables 
In a final step, we want to shed light on (self-) selection of workers. For this purpose, we 
employ difference-in-difference, matching, and control function techniques.
28 A foreign 
takeover of an indigenous firm can be considered a treatment. The research question is: what 
would have happened to wages if the firm had not been taken over? 
 
We apply 3- or 4-stage estimations for repeated cross-section data following Blundell and 
Costa Dias (2000). In a first stage, we estimate by the nearest-neighbor matching method: 
                                                 
27 The group of employees with university degree is quite large compared to the group of white-collar 
managerial workers. Hence, the bias from foreign managers may be much weaker in regressions on workers with 
university degree than on white-collar managerial workers. 
28 There exist countless surveys on matching techniques. See, among others, Heckman and Smith (1997), 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998), Vella and Verbeek (1999), Blundell and Costa Dias (2000), 
Wooldridge (2002), chapter 18, Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004), Imbens (2004), and Blundell et al. (2004) 
for some overview.   31




it ∈ − ≡ ∆ + + 1 , 1 , (36) 
where wit is the monthly wage rate of worker i in year t, T the set of observations containing 
workers who are employed in a firm one year before takeover (treatment group), and 
nn
t i w 1 , +  is 
the wage of a worker in period t+1 of a firm after foreign takeover that corresponds best in 
observable characteristics to worker i. Nearest neighbors are identified by the score of a 
regression of wages with the same control variables that were applied in Table 4 on 
observations of employees in foreign-takeover target firms directly before and after the 
takeover in year t and t+1. This procedure is repeated for each year-pair in the sample. In a 
second stage, a variable 
C
it W ∆  is calculated analogously using only observations of workers in 
firms that are never taken over by foreign investors C (control group). These two stages are 
not reported but available upon request. 
 
Our variable of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). It measures the 
average wage change caused by the foreign takeover and intends to control for workforce 
selection effects of the takeover firm on average-firm wage cost. Hence, the product of ATT 
and the number of workers in foreign takeovers yields the change in the Hungarian wage bill 
caused by foreign M&As. The ATT is formally defined in our context as: 




it ∈ ∆ − ∆ = , (37) 
where 
NT
it W ∆  is the wage growth of workers in foreign takeovers under the presumption that 
the firm would not have been taken over. Since 
NT
it W ∆  is not observable, there are several 
ways to replace it with observable variables. Accordingly varies the third stage of estimation. 
 
If we assume that the foreign-takeover decision is random, we can replace 
NT
it W ∆  by 
C
it W ∆  







it W W ∆ ∆  on a varying set of control variables X and the dummy variable D which takes   32
value 1 if a worker-observation belongs to a firm one year before takeover of a foreign 
investor. These regressions mimic the difference-in-difference method in the case of repeated 
cross-section data. A positive (negative) coefficient on D may be caused by faster (slower) 
learning of workers in foreign-takeover firms or by a decomposition change within 
workplaces according to unobservable worker characteristics. Results are biased by possible 
heterogeneity of the treatment effect and by non-randomness of the foreign-takeover decision. 
Such estimation underlies specifications (1)-(7) in Table 6. 
 
However, it is likely that foreign investors choose carefully their takeover targets according to 
their profits, quality of the workforce, technology and other assets, location, and industry, 
among other factors. Matching techniques are typically used to find a control group of 
indigenous firms that are not taken over by foreign investors but fit best in observable 
characteristics to the takeover firms to exclude such a selection bias. In specifications (8)-
(14), we employ matching techniques.
 29 In particular, an unreported probit estimate of D on a 
set Z of firm and worker characteristics is undertaken and the propensity score φ is calculated. 







it W W ∆ ∆ . An important assumption of matching techniques is that there is no correlation 
of the two error terms of the selection equation and the wage regression. 
 
Heckman (1979) suggests a two-stage procedure to control for such a correlation. First, a self-
selection correction term λ is calculated from a probit propensity score estimate φ of D on Z
30, 
i.e. D=1(m(Z)+ν≥0) with 1(.) indicator function, m(.) an appropriate functional form, and ν 
selection equation error term, 
                                                 
29 We use the STATA program psmatch2 of Leuven and Sianesi (2004). Whenever several nearest neighbours 
with identical propensity score exist, then the wages are averaged across them. 
30 X may be a subset of Z. For proper identification, Z should contain at least one variable additional to X 
(exclusion criterium). We use the share of white-collar workers in a firm, and its interaction term with other 










λ D D , (38) 
where Φ is the cumulative density function corresponding to φ and function arguments are 
suppressed for convenience. Second, an augmented regression is run as follows: 






, , (39) 
where b, d, and ρ are regression coefficients and ε the usual error term. Moreover, it holds 
that sign[ρ]=sign[cov(ε,ν)]. A significantly positive ρ implies that the foreign investor targets 
firms in period t that have a workforce with particularly large unexplained wage growth in 
period t+1 independent of the takeover event when controlling for observable worker and firm 
characteristics in t. 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Without any control variables, the differential wage fall after takeover is 4 % and highly 
significant, as can be seen from specification (1) of Table 6. The result sustains, when adding 
more control variables in specification (2), but collapses, when applying heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in specification (3). Next, we allow the 
treatment effect to be heterogeneous across treated individuals by interacting the dummy 
variable for employees before takeover with individual characteristics such as education, 
occupation, experience, firm size and gender. Now, the wage drops by 7% and becomes 
highly significant again. Since heterogeneity seems to matter, we split next the sample 
according to education level. Employees with vocational training or less have an insignificant 
wage drop after takeover, while employees with secondary education have a highly significant 
wage fall of 8%. Employees with university degree have no significant change in the wage 
premium after takeover. However, the standard error is extremely large indicating that there is 
                                                                                                                                                          
characteristic that may explain the probability of takeover of a firm, but is not needed to explain individual 
wages, since we control for occupation by an individual characteristic.   34
heterogeneity of wage setting in this group. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
few foreign managers obtain a wage that is well above the average for such positions. Since 
they are new in the sample after takeover but still matched to the old managers with the same 
job characteristics, their wages will show up as a wage increase after takeover that may 
compensate the wage decrease of domestic employees with university degree. Since we are 
unable to identify exactly foreign managers in our sample, we will henceforth focus on the 
education group with secondary education. 
 
Next, we turn to third stage matching techniques that control for observable selection bias by 
modeling the foreign takeover decision. The selection equation explains the probability of a 
firm being a takeover target by their share of white-collar workers, their average labour 
productivity, and their operating profits besides region-, industry- and year dummies. We also 
include personal characteristics. The propensity score is obtained from conditional logit 
estimation with occupation fixed effects.
31 A nearest neighbor match based on the propensity 
score yields an ATT of -6% which is significant at the 5% level according to a bootstrapped 
bias-corrected percentile distribution with 200 repetitions.
32 The result is robust to reducing 
the caliper size such that only 89% or 67% of all treated observations have a matching 
partner. It is also robust to 25-nearest neighbor matching, radius matching, or kernel matching 
techniques at various bandwidth parameters. 
 
Finally, Heckman estimates imply a wage drop of 19% among workers with secondary 
education after takeover. At the same time the hazard-rate estimate ρ is positive and highly 
significant. As argued before, matching techniques do thus not take into consideration that 
                                                 
31 The pseudo R
2 is 0.2. However, Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) show that this is no guarantee for a 
correct specification. In fact, bias may even increase if information is added to the selection equation, as long as 
the minimum relevant information set is not available to the econometrician. Occasionally, covariance 
imbalancing is tested to ensure that the propensity score is a proper index for neighborhood of all covariates. 
However, Imbens (2004), section 3.3.2, points out that this is a rule of thumb.    35
wage growth is above average in takeover-target firms due to some unobservable 
characteristics. Since this target-firm characteristic cannot be identified against the wage drop 
caused by the foreign-takeover event, the estimated wage drop assigned to the takeover event 
picks up partially the contrary effect of the unobservable target-firm characteristic. Hence, 
matching techniques underestimate the wage drop caused by the foreign-takeover event.  One 
possible explanation could be that foreign-takeover target firms have very innovative workers 
who constantly improve upon firm efficiency and are consequently rewarded with larger wage 
growth relative to workers in firms that are not innovative. The unobservable innovation 
potential may, however, be exactly the reason for the foreign takeover thereby causing a 
positive correlation of ε and ν, and thus a positive ρ. 
 
4.4) Productivity and Worker Turnover 
We turn now to the other two stylized facts of our model. We first compare the development 
of total factor productivity before and after takeover compared to the benchmark of 
indigenous firms. For this purpose, we estimate a production function with value added per 
worker as dependent variable and capital intensity, share of white-collar workers, firm-, 
region-, year dummies, and the same takeover dummies as in Table 3. Although we estimate a 
firm regression, we weight each observation by the number of employees per firm in our 
worker sample to keep the results across datasets comparable. The numbers of observations 
that are reported in Table 7 are then inflated by the weights. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
Interestingly, the OLS results in specification (1) of Table 7 show that total factor productivity 
rises gradually over the years after the takeover. There is no significant fall in productivity 
                                                                                                                                                          
32 When applying the bootstrap, we ignore the estimation error that may occur from the first two matching stages 
and the estimation of the propensity score. While it would be principally possible to include these errors, such an   36
immediately after takeover at the 5% level, even when controlling for firm fixed effects and 
applying the Arellano (1987) covariance matrix in specification (2). This result is in line with 
our assumption of gradual learning. 
 
Next, we investigate labor turnover. Since we do not have this information directly, we 
proceed in two steps. First, we estimate a regression with firm employment as dependent 
variable and control variables analogue to the production function estimation of specification 
(1). From specification (3) and (4), we can see that employment of foreign acquisitions rises 
significantly by about 11% over the years after takeover. In a second step, we employ a 
variable that indicates whether a worker is new in this firm or has been working for it already 
in the previous year. This variable is available in our dataset over five years from 1997 until 
2001. Specification (5) estimates a Logit-regression to explain the probability of a worker of 
being new in a firm. As control variables are used those for the wage regressions. The 
probability that a worker is new in the firm is falling below average over the years after the 
takeover. This is still true, when applying clustered standard errors in specification (6). If the 
probability of being a new worker falls while employment rises, then the newly hired workers 
stick firmly to the acquired firm in the long run and the worker turnover rate must drastically 
decrease. However, this rejects the regime of our model, where MNEs specialize in training 
workers and local firms benefit through technology spillover effects from hiring them. 
 
Overall, only H0 is consistent with all three stylized facts that are investigated in this study 
and we conclude that our empirical evidence is in line with our theoretical model in the 
regime, when the host country does not directly benefit from technology spillover effects 
through foreign acquisitions. 
 
5) Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                          
enlarged bootstrap is beyond computational feasibility (expected computer running time is several years).   37
The FDI technology spillover debate is one important approach to produce a piece of 
evidence for whether and how host countries may benefit from MNEs. We have investigated 
this issue by setting up a theoretical model which assumes that learning from MNEs takes 
time. Then, MNEs are able to internalize learning externalities by offering lower wages before 
and higher wages after learning has taken place. We find such a wage profile for high-skilled 
workers in foreign-takeover firms in Hungary even when employing techniques that control 
for takeover selection bias by observables and unobservables. We also find that the 
productivity of foreign takeovers grows slowly over the years after the takeover, which 
justifies the assumption that learning takes time. Finally, the worker turnover rate drops after 
takeover. Because MNE workers are not hired by local firms, there cannot be technology 
spillover effects. Otherwise, local firms would overbid the MNE on MNE-trained workers. 
Since, in addition, MNEs are able to internalize learning gains of their workers through the 
wage-time profile, host countries do not benefit from learning or technology spillovers. 
 
Several caveats remain with respect to our analysis. First, our results apply only to foreign 
takeovers due to lack of data to identify greenfield investments. Second, we are able to control 
for takeover decision selection bias on observable and unobservables, but we are unable to 
control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics of workers in the wage regression. 
 
Our results have several implications for the FDI literature. First, when employing a 
theoretical model to guide the empirical research, we show that productivity gains of 
indigenous firms through FDI technology spillovers are not sufficient to conclude on welfare 
gains of a host country. Instead, host-country benefits may materialize by higher indigenous 
firm profits or lower product prices after foreign takeover in a sector. Finally, FDI spillover 
effects may eventually become effective through general equilibrium effects such as increased 
demand for labor and increase of the wage level of the entire economy which cannot be 
shown with micro-data, because the cross-country variation is typically missing.   38
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Tables and Figures 
 




Table 1: Domestic and foreign-owned firms and number of ownership changes in the sample 


















1992 1950  239 28 8 205 
1993 2110  426 22 3 183 
1994 2197  513 31 9 114 
1995 1968  583 25 10 121 
1996 1821  613 25 21 73 
1997 1779  653 18 12 85 
1998 1817  681 12 25 81 
1999 1885  728 27 17 96 
2000 2076  843 26 20 139 
2001 2093  832 - - 100 
Total - - 214 125 - 
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F-test  - 
 







2  0.56  0.55  0.60 0.64 0.67  0.67 
Observations  343 450  235655  107795  275 389  343 450  343 450 
Notes: heteroscedasticity-consistent t-values are in parenthesis. *** denotes 99% significance level, ** 95%, * 90%. Additional control 
variables include firm size categories, year dummies, 2-digit industry dummies and 21 region dummies. 
†  F-Test for significance of joint 
significance of 538 occupation-group fixed-effects with 538 and 274787 degrees of freedom. Probability of insignificance in parenthesis; 
‡ 
F-Test for significance of firm fixed effects. Probability of insignificance in parenthesis; EXPERIENCE^X means EXPERIENCE to the 
power of X.  
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Table 3: Wage regressions with takeovers 
Dependent variable: 









































 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
1-Year before 
































































3- or more Years after 








































F-test Fixed Effects  - 
 




2   0.57  0.66  0.64  0.59 
Observations    343 450    343 450  275 397  275 397 
Notes: heteroscedasticity-consistent t-values are in parenthesis. *** denotes 99% significance level, ** 95%, * 90%. 
† X-Years after 
ownership change has no meaning for unclassified firms (= firms that enter as foreign owned into the sample and stay this way). Instead, X-
years of sample entry are counted. FE is a fixed effect estimation with firm-specific fixed effects. RE is a firm-random effect estimator; F-
Test for significance of firm fixed effects. Probability of insignificance of fixed effects in parenthesis. Additional control variables include 
firm size categories, year dummies, 2-digit industry dummies and region dummies, EDUCATION1, EDUCATION2, EDUCATION3, 
EDUCATION4, EXPERIENCE^1, EXPERIENCE^2, EXPERIENCE^3, EXPERIENCE^4, white collar managerial and non-managerial, 
male, log average labour productivity of firm, log capital intensity. Dummy variables for unclassified firms and for domestic takeovers of 
foreign owned firms are always included. 
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Year of Ownership Change 
- New Worker (B’) 
 




Year of Ownership Change 
- Old Worker (B’’) 


























3- or more Years after 
























F-Test; H0: (A)=(B’) 
 




F-Test; H0: (B’)=(E) 
 




F-Test; H0: (A)=(B’’) 
 




F-Test; H0: (B’’)=(E) 
 





2  0.56 0.64  0.61  0.66 
Observations  343 450  275 397  173 060  173 060 
Notes: heteroscedasticity-consistent t-values are in parenthesis. *** denotes 99% significance level, ** 95%, * 90%. 
† X-Years after 
ownership change has no meaning for unclassified firms (= firms that enter as foreign owned firms into the sample and stay this way). 
Instead, X-years of sample entry are counted. FE is a fixed effect estimation with firm-specific fixed effects. RE is a firm-random effect 
estimator; OLS Cluster is a GLS estimator that allows for intra-firm autocorrelation and firm-specific heteroscedasticity of general form. F-
Test for significance of firm fixed effects. Probability of insignificance of fixed effects in parenthesis. Additional control variables include 
firm size categories, year dummies, 2-digit industry dummies and region dummies, EDUCATION1, EDUCATION2, EDUCATION3, 
EDUCATION4, EXPERIENCE^1, EXPERIENCE^2, EXPERIENCE^3, EXPERIENCE^4, white collar managerial and non-managerial, 
male, log average labour productivity of firm, log capital intensity. With firm specific fixed effects the last two variables are excluded. 
Dummy variables for unclassified firms and for domestic takeovers of foreign owned firms are always included.   46




























 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 

























Year of Ownership Change 
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3- or more Years after 























































































2 0.55  0.61  0.43  0.52  0.53  0.54 
Observations  122 433  47 005  3622  41 794  49 979  18 674 
Notes: t-values from Arellano (1987) covariance matrix are in parenthesis. *** denotes 99% significance level, ** 95%, * 90%. F-Test for 
firm fixed effects. Probability of insignificance of fixed effects in parenthesis. Additional control variables include 532 occupation fixed 
effects, firm size categories, year dummies, 2-digit industry dummies, region dummies, EDUCATION1, EDUCATION2, EDUCATION3, 
EDUCATION4, EXPERIENCE1, EXPERIENCE2, EXPERIENCE3, EXPERIENCE4, male, log average labour productivity of firm, log 
capital intensity. Dummy variables for unclassified firms and for domestic takeovers of foreign owned firms are always included. 
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Table 6: Two- and three stage matching results full sample – First-stage-NN matching 
Specification 
Outcome Variable: 
Annual matched growth rate of wages 


































rd stage OLS – few controls
† 
 
-0.03*** [-0.01;-0.06]  3703  100  109  937 
(3) 3




-0.04 [-0.09;0.01]  3703  100  109  937 
(4) 3















rd stage cluster regression – 
vocational training or less 
 
-0.02 [-0.07;0.02]  2003  100  72  255 
(6) 3
rd stage cluster regression – 
secondary education 
-0.08** [0.01;0.14] 1398  100  31  775 
(7) 3
rd stage cluster regression – 
University degree 
 
0.02 [-0.13;0.09]  302  100  5  907 
(8)  Nearest Neighbor Matching – 













(9)  Nearest Neighbor Matching – 













(10)  25-Nearest Neighbor Matching – 













(11)  Radius Matching – secondary 












(12)  Kernel Matching -  – secondary 
education – bandwidth 0.001 
 
-0.05** [-0.08;-0.03] 1398  100  46  673 
(13)  Kernel Matching -  – secondary 
education – bandwidth 0.0001 
 
-0.06** [-0.10;-0.03] 1398  89  46  673 
(14)  Kernel Matching -  – secondary 
education – bandwidth 0.00001 
 
-0.06** [-0.12;-0.03] 1398  67  46  673 
(15) Heckman  Estimate  -0.19*** [-0.11;-0.27]  1398  100  105  487 
           
Notes: First stage matches by the nearest neighbor method a worker in a firm that has just been taken over by foreign investors with  workers in 
firms one year before foreign takeover in the previous year and calculates the log- wage difference; Common support is 62% of all treated 
observations; The second stage matches workers of indigenous firms (i.e. firms with domestic owners that are never  taken over) with 
observations from the previous year and calculates the log-wage difference; The third stage either regresses the 1
st stage matched log-wage 
difference on the 2
nd stage log-wage difference in addition to control variables or uses matching techniques; For matching, a propensity score is 
estimated based on a conditional fixed effect logit estimator with individual and firm characteristics as regressors and 532 occupation dummies as 
fixed effects. ATT denotes average treatment effect on the treated; Confidence intervals on ATT are either obtained from estimated covariance 
matrices of regression analysis or obtained from 200 bootstrap repetitions in the case of matching techniques; Confidence intervals do not take 
into consideration the estimation error from the first and second stage matching and from the estimation error of the propensity score;   
† Few controls contains: year, industry, region, occupation dummies; 
‡Full controls contains additionally: firm size, sex, education dummies, a polynomial of experience, average firm capital intensity and average 
firm labor productivity;  
# confidence interval is obtained from 200 bootstrap replications;  48


























 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
1-Year before Ow-























































































































2 0.52  0.86  0.93  0.98  0.05  0.05 
Observations  335 971  335 971  335 971  335 971  173 060  173 060 
Notes: * 10% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** 1% significance level; t-values in parenthesis; OLS estimates use 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors; F-test: Wald test that tests equality of coefficients; Marginal probability of H0 in parenthesis; 
All regressions use unreported control variables on firm size categories, year dummies, 2-digit industry dummies, region dummies, log 
average labor productivity of firm, log capital intensity, share of white-collar workers. Dummy variables for unclassified firms and for 
domestic takeovers of foreign-owned firms are always included. 
 
 